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In 2001, use of the STRIDE data base for the purposes of analyzing drug prices and the impact of
public policies on drug markets came under serious attack by the National Research Council (Manski
et al., 2001; Horowitz, 2001).   While some of the criticisms raised by the committee were valid, many
of the concerns can be easily addressed through more careful use of the data. In this paper, we first
disprove Horowitz's main argument that prices are different for observations collected by different
agencies within a city.  We then revisit other issues raised by the NRC and discuss how certain limitations
can be easily overcome through the adoption of random coefficient models of drug prices and by paying
serious attention to drug form and distribution levels.  Although the sample remains a convenience
sample, we demonstrate how construction of city-specific price and purity series that pay careful attention
to the data and incorporate existing knowledge of drug markets (e.g. the expected purity hypothesis)
are internally consistent and can be externally validated.  The findings from this study have important
implications regarding the utility of these data and the appropriateness of using them in economic

























preuter@umd.edu1.  INTRODUCTION 
During this period of rising government debt, significant attention is again being given to 
the substantial amount of tax payer dollars allocated to controlling illicit drug use.  In FY 2008, 
the federal government spent nearly $13 billion trying to control the U.S. drug problem, of which 
$8.3 billion was spent on disrupting illicit drug markets (ONDCP, 2007).  The enormous outlay 
continues despite criticisms that the federal government lacks a means for evaluating the 
effectiveness of their policies and the money being spent (National Research Council (NRC), 
2001).   
One of the primary data sources used for evaluating the impact of supply side strategies 
on drug markets is the Drug Enforcement Agency’s (DEA’s) System to Retrieve Information 
from Drug Evidence (STRIDE) database.  The DEA has been collecting information on drug 
transactions made by federal agents, law enforcement and their informants as part of the 
STRIDE database since the late 1970s.  The data include information on the nature of the 
transaction (a purchase or a seizure), where it took place, the total amount paid when the 
transaction involved a purchase, the type of illicit substance, the quantity involved, and for most 
drugs the purity of the drug.   A major criticism of the data is that they represent a convenience 
sample and are generated by purposeful policing activities (NRC, 2001; Horowitz, 2001).  As 
such, the price series generated from STRIDE are believed to be an artifact of the data 
acquisition procedure and not an accurate indicator of price variation within the geographic 
markets in which they are collected.  Evidence supporting this position is provided by Horowitz 
(2001), who shows large differences in price estimates obtained from different agencies within 
the same city, calling to question the internal validity of the data.   2
  The question of whether STRIDE is a valid data source is important to answer for policy 
makers and researchers alike.   Price data are necessary for us to understand both the supply and 
demand for drugs and how markets operate, particularly given the illicit nature of this market.  A 
large stream of research has already been developed using the STRIDE data, informing our 
understanding of drug markets and how they work.  For example, the data have been used to 
examine quantity discounts and quality premia for illicit drugs (Caulkins and Padman, 1993; 
Caulkins, 1994 and 1997a), risk premia in black markets (Miron, 2003; Caulkins & Reuter, 
1998), geographic variation in drug prices (Caulkins, 1995),  the responsiveness of demand for 
illicit drugs (Williams et al., 2004; DeSimone and Farrelly, 2003; Grossman and Chaloupka, 
1998; Saffer and Chaloupka, 1999) and harms from drug use (Dave, 2006; Dobkins and Nicosia, 
Forthcoming; Caulkins, 2001).   In addition, policy makers use information to reconcile supply- 
and demand- side estimates of the total amount of specific illicit drugs produced and consumed.  
If the data are flawed, then knowledge we think we gained from these analyses must also be 
reconsidered.   Moreover, we lose the only current source of data for which information is 
available on transaction price, quantity and potency.  No other national data system collects this 
kind of information on drug prices.  
In this paper we reconsider the issue of the validity of the STRIDE data for estimating 
drug price series.   We test the internal validity of STRIDE and demonstrate that when 
substantive knowledge about drug markets is incorporated into the use of STRIDE data, the data 
do in fact generate consistent trends across agencies within the same market, thus refuting the 
main criticism of Horowitz (2001).  Another contribution of this paper is that we develop a 
statistical model of drug price series that reflect substantive knowledge about drug markets. We 
use the Granger-Sims causality framework to demonstrate the external validity of these price 3
  series by using them to predict emergency room mentions, an independent indicator of drug 
demand that is available for cities across the United States.  Therefore, unlike Horowitz (2001) 
and the NRC (2001), we conclude that STRIDE is useful for estimating trends in the price of 
illicit drugs.   
 
2. THE STRIDE DATA 
For over 25 years, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has maintained detailed 
information on drug transactions made by federal, state and local agencies engaged in law 
enforcement activities targeting drug markets. The primary purposes of the database are to 
catalog and control the inventory of drug acquisitions made by DEA agents; to keep current with 
the types of drugs being distributed and the characteristics of those drugs; and to use these data 
as part of prosecutions of federal drug offenders.  Only acquisitions that are sent to a DEA 
laboratory for analysis are included in the database, although the acquisition could be made by 
federal agents, local law enforcement, or informants.  While most state and local police agencies 
do not submit information on their undercover acquisitions to DEA laboratories, there are a few 
exceptions—in particular, the Metropolitan Police of Washington, DC.  
 It is the extremely rich content of information contained in STRIDE that makes it 
particularly appealing to researchers and policy analysts.  The STRIDE data indicate the date, 
location, nature of the acquisition by law enforcement (seizure or purchase), weight, purity, 
chemical nature of the drug, and, for purchases only, the price paid. 
The main limitation of STRIDE is that the data contained within it are neither a random, 
probabilistic, or representative sample of all drug transactions occurring in any geographic area.    
Of course, it would be difficult to create such a sampling frame given the underground nature of 4
  drug markets, but the concern is that the data are generated as a result of purposeful law 
enforcement activities that are both strategic and deterministic.  The timing and location of 
encounters are often erratic and the number of observations from a given location can vary 
dramatically from year to year, particularly for smaller cities.   Furthermore, there is concern that 
the data in the sample may be biased if law enforcement agents pay systematically different 
prices than typical buyers in the market (Caulkins, 1997b).  It has been argued that law 
enforcement agents and their informants risk detection if they appear ignorant of reasonable 
pricing for specific quantities of drug.  Even if law enforcement agents do pay more on average, 
as long as the bias is stable over time the data would still be useful for understanding movement 
in prices over time.  Nonetheless, both the nature of how the sample is created as well as the 
biases possibly contained in it have important implications for how these data can be used 
(Caulkins et al., 2004). 
 
3.  THE HOROWITZ CRITIQUE 
Horowitz’ (2001) critique focuses on the issue of representativeness of STRIDE by 
examining observations within a single city with an uncharacteristically high number of 
observations, Washington, DC.   In this city, there are a substantial number of observations 
generated by two specific agencies, the DEA and the Metropolitan Police of DC (MPDC), as 
well as a number of observations from other Federal and state (Virginia  and Maryland) agencies 
and programs.   The real distribution of prices paid is unknown, so Horowitz tests whether the 
distribution of prices generated by DEA and the MPDC agencies are similar, given the argument 
that if buyers from different agencies within the same city and time period pay significantly 5
  different prices per pure gram, then that would raise serious doubts about the reliability of the 
data and its utility.   
  Although some price dispersion is expected for a black market good, the trend in prices 
across agencies should be the same if the variation is random.  However, if nonrandom factors 
influence the distribution of prices in the market, such as familiarity between buyers and sellers, 
then it is possible that changes in these nonrandom factors over time could lead to observed price 
changes in that market in the absence of a real change in the distribution of prices.  Specifically, 
Horowitz argues that law enforcement agents within the MPDC are more likely than DEA agents 
in Washington DC to be familiar with the local drug markets and build long term relationships 
with low-end dealers.    
Horowitz estimates price models using data from 1990 through the second quarter of 
1998.  Using Least Absolute Deviation in order to minimize the impact of outliers, his model is 
the following: 
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where Πijt is the real (inflation-adjusted) price per gram for observation i by agency j in year t, P 
is purity, MD and VA are dummy variables for having the transaction take place in Maryland and 
Virginia, and the quantity (AMT) variables are the following (with Q being the measure of 
quantity of the transaction in grams): 
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These quantity variables allow for a spline with the knot at log(Q) equal to -1.5,  the 
equivalent of 0.22 grams.  An additional spline knot for DEA observations is used for 1991 and 
1992 at 2.7 grams.  The additional spline knot is added in partial recognition of the fact that the 6
  typical transaction amount for DEA agents is systematically larger than that of the MPDC and 
hence might reflect higher quantity discounts given the larger transaction purchases made.     
Horowitz estimates this model for both DEA and MPDC observations and conducts 
several tests of whether the observed markets are the same across agencies.  These include: (1) 
asymptotic chi-squared tests for whether the coefficient estimates for each year are the same for 
DEA and MPDC observations; (2) asymptotic chi-square tests for the coefficient estimates on 
the quantity discount (β2); and (3) asymptotic chi-square tests that the nine annual predicted 
prices for the MPDC and DEA models (evaluated at one gram and 75 percent purity) are the 
same. 
In the chi-squared tests for crack cocaine, Horowitz finds that the coefficient estimates 
and predicted prices are statistically significantly different for the MPDC and DEA models.  
Furthermore, he finds that the price levels and trends are different.  He concludes that both the 
MPDC and DEA sets of observations cannot both be representative of the true crack cocaine 
market, so we cannot know what the actual market distribution is.  He shows similar results for 
heroin and thus concludes that the data should not be used to evaluate policy. 
 
4.  THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING SUPPLY CHAINS FOR DRUGS 
There are two major problems in Horowitz’ analysis.  First, he ignores the fact that 
distribution levels in drug markets are characterized by differences in average purity and average 
quantity traded (Caulkins, 1994).  The average purity of a drug traded at the wholesale 
distribution level is typically higher than the average purity of a drug traded at the retail level 
(e.g., a street dealer selling to an individual user), especially for powder cocaine and heroin.   
Drugs get diluted as they move down the distribution chain in the United States (Caulkins, 7
  1997a).   Tables 1 and 2 show that the DEA observations are not only more likely to involve 
transactions of 5 or more grams (a higher part of the supply chain) in the case of crack and 
heroin, but they also involve higher purity.  The MPDC participates in purchases that are 
typically much smaller (closer to retail transactions) and on average have lower purity.   
Although Horowitz’s models allow for the relationship between price and quantity to differ 
across specific quantity levels, they do not allow the relationship between price and the purity of 
the drug to change.  
The second major problem with Horowitz’ analysis is that, given the differences in 
quantity and purity between higher and lower distribution levels, any chosen quantity and purity 
at which to evaluate predicted price could not be in the central part of the range of values for 
both distribution levels.  Horowitz uses one gram as the evaluation quantity for crack cocaine, 
which is high in the distribution for the MPDC sample (85
th percentile) and low in the 
distribution for the DEA sample (11
th percentile).   
To demonstrate the importance of recognizing the differences in quantities and purity 
across different levels of the supply chain (i.e., different distribution levels) and in using out-of-
range evaluation quantities, we replicate Horowitz’ model and original findings and then 
demonstrate how incorporating knowledge of distribution levels changes his primary results.  We 
begin by estimating a model identical to Horowitz for crack cocaine.  We predict prices by 
evaluating them at a quantity of one gram at 75 percent purity in Washington, DC (following 
Horowitz).  The predicted prices generated from this model yield identical price trends to those 
reported in Horowitz (see Figure 1).   An asymptotic chi-squared test of the null hypothesis that 
the predicted prices from the DEA and MPDC models are equal (χ
2(9)=109.91, p=0) is 
consistent with the result obtained by Horowitz and we also reject the null.  Note that we cannot 8
  produce the exact price series and test statistics as Horowitz (2001) because the sample changes 
over time due to observations being added to the sample as cases get closed. 
 
           -- Insert Figure 1 about here --- 
    
Next we examine price series from the same agencies but break the data into two “distribution” 
levels. The specification of distribution levels is not a precise science.  Although the term “retail” 
typically refers to transactions where the buyer is the end-user, there is no way of identifying end 
users from low-end sellers in the STRIDE data.  Although some transaction sizes are relatively 
more common than others in the data, it is not clear which transaction sizes only identify end 
users.  In previous work (Caulkins et al., 2004; Arkes et al., 2004), transactions involving up to 
one gram of crack cocaine were defined as retail-level transactions.  Using this cut-off when 
examining data from these two agencies, however, we see from Table 1 that we would have very 
few observations in the DEA sample for some years in our retail sample, making estimation of a 
price series from the DEA series very imprecise.  Instead, to increase the number of DEA 
observations included in the lower distribution level, we use 5 grams as our threshold for 
differentiating two basic markets.  Although not ideal, this approach enables us to have 
observations from both agencies in both samples and makes the samples more homogenous 
relative to specific markets.  It is still possible that quantity discounts differ within these markets 
given how broadly they have been defined.   However, the goal here is not to precisely identify 
separate markets and the magnitude of the price discounts across them, but rather to demonstrate 
that ignoring their existence can generate misleading results.
1  In separating the model into two 
                                                 
1 For the lower distribution level (less than or equal to 5 grams), we have the problem of over fitting with the DEA 
sample, as we only have 217 observations from the DEA and 50 explanatory variables in our Horowitz replication 9
  distribution levels, we must make one additional modification to Horowitz’s model.  For the 
lower distribution level, there were several years with too few observations in Maryland and 
Virginia for identification so we had to exclude these year-state interaction terms; for the higher 
distribution levels, there were more observations in each year, but including them made little 
difference for the price series. 
If we assume that these two distribution levels represent different points in a supply 
chain, then we need to consider evaluating prices at a quantity and purity that is representative of 
the typical transaction occurring within that distribution level.  For the lower distribution level, 
we use one gram and 75 percent purity, just as Horowitz had.  Even with the more homogeneous 
samples between DEA and MPDC, one gram is at the 45
th percentile for the DEA observations 
and 93
rd percentile for the MPDC observations.  Thus, it is possible that the predicted prices from 
these two series will look fairly different because the typical transaction made by each of these 
agencies even within this cut-off are quite different.  For the higher distribution level, we 
evaluate price at 75 percent purity and 25 grams, which is the 35
th percentile for DEA 
observations and the 49
th percentile for MPDC observations.
2 
Figure 2 presents the price charts for crack cocaine for the lower quantity distribution 
involving amounts less than or equal to 5 grams.  The prices for the DEA and MPDC 
observations are much more similar in this case than they were when all the observations are 
pooled across distribution levels.  While the predicted price remains higher for DEA 
                                                                                                                                                             
model due to interactions between year and location identifiers for Maryland and Virginia.  We tested for the joint 
significance of these interactions and found them to be insignificant.  There are hardly any observations from 
Maryland or Virginia in the MDPC data, so all coefficient estimates on the interaction terms are dropped from that 
model automatically.  In the sample of observations greater than 5 grams, the interaction terms are again jointly 
insignificant.   Thus, to reduce the number of parameters that need to be estimated and the problem of over fitting, 
we drop the interaction terms from the models we estimate next. 
 
2 If we had chosen 30 grams, that would have been the 52
nd percentile for DEA observations and the 66
th percentile 
for MPDC observations. 10
  observations than MPDC observations, the difference in the prices is no longer statistically 
significant (χ
2(9)=2.57, p=0.97).  In addition, the correlation between the two series is 0.68. 
    --    Insert Figure 2 about here --  
The predicted prices each agency generated from the models at higher quantity 
distribution are even closer, as can be seen in Figure 3.   Again, the difference in the prices are 
insignificant (χ
2(9)=7.95, p=.54), and the series are highly correlated (corr=0.89).   Further, as 
one would expect given the existence of quantity discounts, the predicted prices per gram at the 
higher quantity level are actually lower than the predicted prices per gram at the lower quantity 
level for both agencies (as can be seen by comparing Figure 2 and Figure 3). 
 
        --   Insert Figure 3 about here  --  
 
In Figures A1 and A2 in the Appendix, we show that the results by distribution level hold 
when we extend the data through the end of 2005.  We find no significant differences in 
predicted prices generated from the two different agencies at either distribution level and the 
agency trends look even more similar in the later years for both levels.  The correlations between 
the DEA and MPDC price series are 0.65 for the lower level and 0.81 for the higher distribution 
level.         
Finally, we formally test whether we need to split the sample into different distribution 
levels.  For both the DEA and MPDC samples, we include interaction terms of the indicator for 
the higher distribution level with each yearly quantity and purity variable.  We then test for the 
joint significance of the interaction terms.  The test statistics for the DEA and MPDC samples, 
respectively, are F27, 712 = 2.36 (p<0.0001) and F27, 2608=2.46 (p<0.0001), indicating that it is 
important to split the sample by distribution level.  11
  To summarize the findings from our replication of Horowitz’s work, we find that the 
price differences observed between DEA and MPDC observations are primarily due to 
differences between these agencies in the level of the supply chain targeted by the policing 
activities.  Differences in average prices as well as price trends disappear once observations are 
analyzed on a market-level basis. 
 
5.  ADDITIONAL ISSUES TO CONSIDER WHEN USING STRIDE HEROIN DATA 
The model above demonstrates that recognition of a supply chain has important 
implications on the consistency of price trends generated from the STRIDE data.  Horowitz also 
examined heroin observations, considering three price series in Washington DC in light of what 
he believed to be sufficient data observations from MPDC, DEA, and the Domestic Monitoring 
Program (DMP).  Ignoring differences in distribution levels of the supply chain, Horowitz finds 
that different predicted price trends exist by agency/program when evaluated at a common 
weight (0.75 grams) and purity (20 percent).   It is easy to explain the differences in predicted 
trends between the DEA and MPDC in light of the significantly different quantities involved in 
typical transactions.  Looking at Table 2, DEA observations generally involve higher quantities 
than the MPDC (and the DMP) observations, with 88% of DEA observations in the higher 
distribution level (g > 1) but 87-88% of MPDC’s and DMP’s observations at the retail level 
(g≤1).  In fact, Table 2 shows there are not enough small DEA observations or large MPDC 
observations to conduct any analysis by market level for both series; the two agencies do not 
make enough purchases on overlapping quantities.    
Although the MPDC and DMP series both have a large number of observations less than 
or equal to one gram between 1997 and 2004, it would still be inappropriate to compare these 12
  two series in light of the heterogeneous types of heroin represented in the DMP sample.  The 
DMP observations, unlike other observations in the STRIDE data, are generated by random 
purchases made by law enforcement agents or their informants with the sole purpose of 
monitoring the quality, type and amount of heroin available on the street in particular cities, as 
opposed to collecting data for prosecutions.  Each quarter they go out on the streets and see how 
much heroin and what type of heroin they can get for $100.  These are not part of strategic 
activities, but rather reflect random buys out on the street, conducted purely for the purposes of 
monitoring heroin supply.  Although that may make the DMP series sound ideal for analytical 
use, the problem is that different types of heroin are purchased under this program, and the type 
varies substantially within and across cities and over time.
3   The type of heroin is indicated 
through secondary drug codes available in the STRIDE database, but is not usually investigated.   
Thus, the only way to use DMP observations in a meaningful way is to disaggregate them into 
the actual type of heroin purchased, which dramatically reduces the sample size for Washington 
DC.  Thus, one should not compare prices from DMP to those of the other agencies but the 
reason is that these do not represent a homogenous product.   
 
6.  IMPROVING MODELS FOR ESTIMATING PRICES FROM STRIDE   
6.1  Constructing an Appropriate Model for Drug Prices 
It is important to realize that the flaws in Horowitz’s previous work were not statistically 
based but rather the result of disregarding knowledge of how drug markets operate.  Despite this 
oversight, Horowitz generally recognized other important aspects of these markets that need to 
be considered when using these data.  In particular, the paper emphasized considering 
                                                 
3 There are at least three physically distinguishable types of heroin available in the United States:  white heroin, 
black tar heroin and brown heroin. 13
  homogenous drug products and examining trends in localized markets to reduce noise.  
However, as demonstrated here, errors can still occur in light of the general lack of knowledge 
about these data caused by the unavailability of a codebook (e.g. the fact that DMP observations 
mix heterogeneous forms of heroin).  We aim to advance the methods for using these data by 
producing a model for predicting price and purity trends from the STRIDE data that properly 
considers several important aspects of the data and drug markets.  We demonstrate that our 
model generates price series that are not only internally valid but also externally valid.   
There are four primary aspects of drug markets that are important to consider when 
developing price and purity models for illicit drugs.  First, drugs are an experience good, and 
hence purity is not known with certainty at the point the buyer makes the transaction.  Second, 
the effects of quantity and purity on price can be different at different levels, so distribution 
levels matter.  Third, local trends are likely to generally reflect national trends in the long run, 
although short term differences are possible.  Fourth, quantity discounts and average purity 
levels can differ across cities (i.e. drug markets are local).   
To make sure that price series generated from the STRIDE data reflect these four 
considerations, we make several adjustments to Horowitz’s empirical model that result in 
obtaining price series that are both internally and externally valid.  First, to address the fact that 
drugs are experience goods, we estimate price as a function of expected pure amount not actual 
pure amount.   Though a buyer is unlikely to know the purity of a single purchase he/she makes, 
the buyer will have expectations about the purity based on prior experience.   Prior analyses of 
the STRIDE database found evidence of measurement error in observed price and improvements 
in model fit when predicting price with expected rather than observed purity (Caulkins, 1994).  
Therefore, we retain transactions with zero or very low purity that do not have much lower prices 14
  than other observations of a more typical purity because we presume they represent a rip-off 
and are a realistic reflection of what actually happens in the marketplace.   
The second modification to the empirical model is the separation of models at different 
distribution levels.  As shown earlier, separate models at different distribution levels are needed 
because of differences in how quantity and purity affect price at different quantity levels.  We 
sought to define market levels with roughly equal numbers of observations in each level but with 
round number boundaries for the years for which we have data (1981-2005).  In all cases except 
powder cocaine, three levels were identified for each drug, with each level in most cases 
containing between 25 and 50 percent of the total number of observations for that drug.  In the 
case of powder cocaine, there were enough data to identify a fourth distribution level.  Given that 
these market levels’ boundaries were largely data driven, one should assign little meaning to the 
labels assigned to each. 
The final modification to the empirical model is the adoption of hierarchical modeling 
(HM), which enables unique relationships to exist between quantity, purity and price within each 
city while still using information from observations in all cities to estimate general trends 
overall.  Although drug markets are geographically small and limited in terms of how they 
function and their ability to price discriminate, they must all follow a few basic "rules" that are 
the same across all cities.  Price will be a function of both expected purity and quantity, and the 
market would not allow huge deviations from a general range to exist for more then a short 
period of time (when sufficient information flows to correct the differences in markets).    
In the models we present here, we apply hierarchical modeling to data from 29 cities and 
9 regions across the United States.  Models of purity are estimated first using hierarchical linear 
modeling, the results of which are used to formulate estimates of expected purity for each 15
  purchase observation in each city and time period.  The model for purity for transaction i from 
city j at time k is: 
ijk ijk j ijk j j ijk ijk ijk AMT u time u u AMT time Purity ε γ γ γ + + + + + + = 2 1 0 2 1 0                   (2) 
where time is measured using dummy variables representing a year-quarter (i.e., 100 quarters 
over 25 years) or just a year, and AMTijk is the raw weight of the observation. The γ0 through 
γ2 coefficients represent the fixed effects for the intercept, amount, and time, respectively, and 
the corresponding city-specific random effects, u0j-u2j, are assumed to follow normal 
distributions.  Errors εijk are assumed to independently follow a normal distribution with mean 0 
and variance σ
2.  Expected purity was estimated for each observation from this model.  About 
one-half of a percent of heroin cases had predicted purity below 0 percent.  For these, we 
changed the predicted purity to equal 0.5 percent. 
  To model drug prices, we use a hierarchical generalized linear model (Wolfinger & 
O’Connell 1993; Breslow & Clayton 1993) in which price is assumed to follow a gamma 
distribution with mean μ and variance function φμ
2, where  
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                                                              (3) 
where β represents the fixed effects for intercept, time and the logarithm of the amount plus the 
logarithm of the expected purity, φ is a dispersion parameter and the ν terms are the 
corresponding city random effects that are assumed to be normally distributed with mean vector 
0 and variance/covariance matrix D.  The sum of the natural logarithm of quantity (AMT) and 
the natural logarithm of expected purity is a way of specifying the price in terms of the natural 
logarithm of expected pure grams – i.e., multiplying the weight by expected purity generates an 16
  estimate of the weight in expected pure grams.  Specifying amount and expected purity into one 
variable (expected pure grams) also serves to provide identification for the model, which is 
necessary because all of the explanatory variables in the purity model of equation (2) are in the 
price model of equation (3). 
    
6.2  Properly Cleaning STRIDE Data 
It is important to keep in mind that the STRIDE data set is an administrative data system 
used to track inventory of acquisitions; it was not designed for analytical purposes.  Some values 
in the data are likely to reflect input errors or inaccurate reporting, not actual drug prices and 
purities.     
This last point has important implications for how one cleans the data before analyses are 
even conducted.  For example, while working on a project for the Office of National Drug 
Control Policy using STRIDE, we were told by a former DEA lab technician that it is extremely 
difficult to detect the actual purity of a drug when the quantity involved is smaller than 0.1 
grams.  The task is even more difficult depending on the type and form of the drug being 
examined.  When actual purity cannot be detected, a zero value may be used or purity may be 
entered as missing.  Thus, to better differentiate true zero purity observations from those that 
simply reflect an inability to detect a substance, it is common practice to discard observations 
smaller than 0.1 grams.  
  In addition to problems determining actual purity in small transaction amounts, it is the 
case that gross outliers exist in both the price and purity data.  Purity values in excess of 100 
percent do exist in the data and are the result of data entry errors.  Gross outliers in price are also 
common, although it can be difficult to determine what the appropriate bounds are for discarding 17
  these observations.  Following methods similar to those used in the past (Abt, 2001), we specify 
a fairly broad range in which to reasonably expect real prices to fall and then use an extreme 
residual outlier analysis to identify and discard additional observations that appear extreme and 
have a large effect on the regression results.  In terms of gross outliers, we discard observations 
that have a real price per gram (in 2005 dollars) that are outside the $5 to $1500 range for crack 
and powder cocaine and outside the $5 to $2500 range for heroin.  We then estimate the model 
once with just random intercepts; delete extreme residuals by cutting from the sample the 
observations that have the top one percent of residuals on the positive side; and re-estimate the 
model with the full set of random effects across cities. 
 
6.3  Results:  Predicted price series from STRIDE and internal validity 
The models provide a predicted price for each of the 29 cities and 9 regions for each year.  
In Figures 4 through 7, we present price series for each drug for the Washington, DC 
metropolitan area, with the corresponding predicted prices in Tables A1-A4 in the Appendix.  
We show the series for crack cocaine, powder cocaine, and heroin, with three or four distribution 
levels for each drug.  
In Figures 5, 6, and 7, we evaluate prices at 100-percent purity and a quantity that is close 
to the median for each distribution level.  This set-up produces a “price-per-pure-gram.”  In 
Figure 4, however, we evaluate the price at the same quantity levels, but at 75 percent purity and 
just for 1990-2005 in order to generate series that are more comparable to results presented in 
Figures 2 and 3.  It should be remembered though that the evaluation amount still differs in these 
predicted prices using the HM modeling and that results from all agencies reporting data are 
included (not just DEA and MPDC), so direct comparisons need to be made with this in mind.  18
  Overall the price trends generated in Figures 4 through 7 for each of these drugs demonstrate a 
general decrease in the price of each drug since the early- to mid-1980s.  Furthermore, they 
demonstrate that the price per gram varies considerably across the distribution levels for all 
drugs, and that quantity discounts appear to be quite significant.    
If we look more closely at the trend in prices presented in Figure 4 for crack cocaine and 
compare the results involving amounts greater than 15 grams (and evaluated at 38 grams) to 
those presented in Figure 3 (which show results for the two agencies for amounts greater than 5 
grams and evaluated at 25 grams), we see trends that are generally consistent between 1990 and 
1998.  The level of prices predicted for Washington DC from the HM model are slightly higher 
despite being evaluated at a higher quantity level, but this might reflect the fact that transactions 
for DC from other agencies are being included and a longer time period is evaluated (which 
influences the model through the grand mean and city-specific effects).  Despite a relatively 
small difference in levels (both hover around $50 per gram), the trends are generally consistent 
across the two figures.  If you compare the results for up to 1 gram (evaluated at 0.3 grams) in 
Figure 4 to those in Figure 2 (evaluated at 1 gram), the HM series in Figure 4 looks a bit noisier 
and stays at a level closer to $150.  That difference in terms of noise of the series is likely driven 
by the exclusion in our lowest distribution of higher level amounts.  The trend for the second 
distribution level in Figure 4 (amounts involving 1 to 15 grams) is significantly smoother and 
closely parallels that for the MPDC, albeit at a lower level (because it is being evaluated at a 
higher quantity of 5 grams).   
The main point from these comparisons is that merging the data collected by all agencies 
and estimating series for all cities using an HM framework generates a price series that is 
generally consistent with what we observe when estimating series for a single agency in a single 19
  city, providing additional evidence of the internal consistency of the data when used properly.  
When prices are evaluated at 100% purity (as shown in Figure 5 through 7) the trend line moves 
up (i.e. it costs more per gram because of the higher potency, as theory would predict), but the 
trends remain consistent with that observed at lower purities.  But the trends do differ in at least 
one important way across distribution levels for the same drug evaluated at the same purity.  The 
retail level trend (i.e. the trend for the lowest quantity amount) is always noisier than that for 
higher quantity amounts.  There are at least two potential explanations for this:  (1) rip offs are 
far more likely to occur among buyers and sellers at the retail level, where exchanges are more 
frequently made between people who are unfamiliar with each other, and (2) law enforcement 
rarely focuses their attention and resources on small retail transactions, so these series may be 
more sensitive to data composition issues (agencies involved, location of the transaction, etc) 
than transaction at higher levels.  
 
 
7. EXTERNAL VALIDITY OF PRICE SERIES GENERATED USING STRIDE PRICE 
AND PURITY DATA 
While we previously showed that it is possible to generate internally valid price series 
from the data, it is equally important to demonstrate that the trends in price series convey real 
information.  This can be done by directly modeling prices obtained from our constructed price 
series for specific locations with data from external sources tracking other relevant aspects of the 
drug problem that should be highly predicted by prices.  Here we develop a model that tests 
whether the predicted city-specific retail-level prices are reflective of changes in demand, as 
indicated by movements in the number of drug-involved emergency department episodes which 20
  are available at a local level.  In particular, we employ a Granger-Sims causality test (Granger, 
1969) to assess whether changes in the price of a drug predicts the future number of emergency-
room mentions for that drug.  
Data on emergency room mentions come from the 1994-2002 Drug Abuse Warning 
Network (DAWN).  The Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) data provides information on 
the number of instances of cases in which a given drug is involved in emergency department 
(ED) visits or deaths.  DAWN is organized so that it provides estimates on the total number of 
drug-abuse-related ED visits and deaths and the total number of mentions of drugs in 21 cities, 
quarterly, over the 1994-2002 period.  Up to four drugs can be mentioned for a given ED visit, 
and up to six drugs can be mentioned for a death.  We analyze the rate of drug mentions in the 
population for each city. 
To estimate this model, we take the predicted heron prices from the price models, 
described above, for the DAWN cities.  To use a city-quarter observation in our model for ED 
visits, we use the condition that there had to be 5 observations in the one-quarter-lagged city-
quarter cell to be used in the model.
4 We do this so that the price series for these cities closely 
reflected the actual STRIDE data for a given city rather than information borrowed from 
different city-quarters.  We limit the sample to the 16 DAWN cities that had this sufficient 
number of observations for at least 18 of the 36 quarters in the 1994-2002 DAWN period.  No 
cities met these criteria for powder cocaine and only three cities met the criteria for crack 
cocaine.
5  Thus we focus on external validation on the heroin price series. 
                                                 
4 We use lagged because we are examining whether lagged price affects drug mentions. 
5 The cities that we use for the heroin analysis are: Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Denver, Detroit, Miami, New Orleans, 
New York, Newark, Philadelphia, Phoenix, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, St. Louis, and Washington, DC. 21
  To estimate heroin prices, our sample from STRIDE consists of observations that are 
between 0.1 and 1 gram and that have the drug code “9200.005.”
6  From the price models, the 
predicted prices are evaluated at roughly the median quantity and purity levels for the period for 
which DAWN data are available (1994-2002).  The evaluation quantity and purity are 0.4 grams 
and 35%.   
 
7.1  Estimating the Effect of Price or Purity on Emergency-Room Mentions of Heroin 
With the predicted price of heroin, we estimate Poisson regression models to determine 
whether the STRIDE price estimates are meaningful.  We assume that the mean number of 
emergency room visits in city c and quarter t is λct, where: 
∑
=
− − + + + =
L
l
ct t c l t c l c ct n Y P
1
1 , 1 , ) ln( } { ) ln( α β β λ . 
Here Yc,t-l and Pc,t-l are the observed number of emergency room mentions and the price for 
heroin in city c in l quarters lagged from quarter t (e.g., l=1 implies time t-1) up to L lags, and nct 
represents the population of city c at time t.  Thus, for a one-period-lagged model, we are 
examining whether last period’s price affects the current period’s rate of drug mentions in 
emergency rooms while controlling for last period’s rate of drug mentions and emergency room 
mentions.   
Table 3 shows the results of these regressions.  The first column of Table 3 provides the 
coefficient estimates for the one-quarter-lagged model, which includes the lagged price and the 
lagged rate of heroin drug mentions.  The second column shows the coefficients from a two-
quarter-lagged model with both the prices and lagged rate of heroin mentions from both one-
                                                 
6 The latter criterion makes sure we do not include black tar heroin in our heroin observations, given a buyer can 
physically distinguish black tar heroin from white heroin. 22
  quarter and two-quarters lagged.  The model in the third column is the same one-quarter-lagged 
model of the first column but is fit to the same set of observations as is the two-quarter-lagged 
model in order to facilitate comparison of the one-lagged and two-lagged models using the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).  The number of observations is lower for the two-quarter-
lagged model because there is the additional requirement that there had to be at least 5 valid 
STRIDE observations for the city not just for the lagged quarter, but also for the twice-lagged 
quarter.  
In model (1), the one-quarter lagged heroin prices have a negative and significant effect 
on emergency room mentions of heroin.  A $10 increase in the price of a pure gram leads to a 
1.7-percent decrease in heroin mentions in emergency rooms (p<0.01).  In the two-quarter-
lagged model (2), the one-quarter-lagged price turns out to be small and insignificant, but the 
two-quarter-lagged price is negative and significant, indicating again that a higher price for 
heroin leads to fewer heroin-related emergency-room visits.  In model (3), again using the one-
quarter-lagged model, but with just the sample size from model (2), the coefficient estimate on 
price is no longer significant.  The BIC is lower in the two-quarter-lagged model than in the one-
quarter-lagged model (column 3), suggesting that this is a better model than the one-quarter-
lagged model.  Though there is a difference in the significance of the one-quarter lagged heroin 
price in models (1) and (3), this is attributable to the loss of 78 observations when including two-
quarter lags in the model and we use column (1) as the definitive results for the model containing 
a one-quarter lag.  
The results from the first two models support the conclusion that higher prices predict 
lower demand for heroin, as indicated by the number of accidents and events related to heroin.  
The fact that price series generated from STRIDE data are not just statistically correlated with an 23
  independent city-specific data series tracking a different aspect of the drug problem but also 
have predictive power supports the conclusion that real information is being provided in these 
data.  Such a conclusion goes a step further than findings from other studies that have just shown 
a correlation between price series generated from STRIDE and other measures of the drug 
problem (Dobkins & Nicosia, Forthcoming, Dave 2006, Williams et al, 2004, DeSimone & 
Farrelly, 2003; Caulkins 2001).  Unlike those previous studies which simply show a strong 
correlation, we empirically test the predictive power of prices using the Granger-Sims causality 




The purpose of this paper is to challenge critiques of the STRIDE data and to establish 
city-specific drug prices in a manner that generates internally and externally consistent price 
series.  Horowitz (2001) claimed that STRIDE was internally inconsistent because prices within 
Washington, DC collected by different law enforcement agencies (DEA and MPDC) were 
different.  We demonstrate that these differences are largely the product of the two agencies 
being involved in transactions at two different levels of the distribution chain.  In particular, 
DEA collected data on large transactions typically at the wholesale and mid-level range, while 
MPDC collected data at the retail level.  When we split the samples by distribution levels, then 
differences in the predicted prices between the two agencies’ observations disappeared.   
We then tested the external validity of a price series that more seriously addressed the 
issue of differential distribution levels and considered the local nature of drug markets.  Price 
series generated from this model were again empirically consistent with simpler models 24
  employing a subset of the data and focusing on just one city.  Finally, we tested the external 
validity of our price series by assessing the correlation and predictive power of our constructed 
prices with an external data source: city-specific heroin-related emergency room episodes.  We 
find that, consistent with economic theory, higher heroin prices lead to a decrease in such 
incidents, thus indicating that demand is lower when price is higher.  More importantly, we show 
that the price series is statistically correlated with external measures of the drug problem in a 
manner one would expect, supporting the notion that real information is conveyed through 
temporal movements of these price data. 
The findings suggest that STRIDE, despite having numerous shortcomings, may still be 
useful to researchers and policy makers interested in examining factors related to changes in 
illicit drug prices over time or using information on changes in prices to understand movements 
in demand or supply.    The findings also show, however, that estimates of the average price 
level from these data at a given point in time are extremely sensitive and uncertain.   When 
estimating average price levels, the nonrepresentativeness of the data as well as analytic 
decisions regarding how to use the data dramatically impact the average price level generated 
from models using the data.  Hence, our analyses do not support the use of STRIDE for studies 
evaluating issues related to the average level of drug prices in a particular point in time.   For 
example, using these data to determine the total expenditure on drugs in a given year or to back 
out total quantity consumed from an expenditure equation at a given point in time is not 
recommended.  However, once proper methods are used to properly clean the data and to take 
into account important aspects of drug markets, the short-term and long-term movements in 
average prices for specific cities evidenced in STRIDE can be used to examine changes in 
demand or supply over time.   25
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  Figure 1.  Predicted price trends for for crack cocaine for DEA and MPDC observations 
in the Washington metropolitan area, evaluated at 1 gram at 75% purity, 1990-1998Q2 












Figure 2.  Predicted price trends for Washington metropolitan area crack cocaine for DEA 
and MPDC observations less than or equal to 5 grams, evaluated at 1 gram and 75% 













  Figure 3.  Predicted price trends for Washington metropolitan area crack cocaine for 
DEA and MPDC observations greater than 5 grams, evaluated at 25 grams and 75% 













Figure 4.  Predicted price-per-gram for crack cocaine in the Washington metropolitan area 

















Note: The prices for the three distribution levels are evaluated at 0.3, 5, and 38 grams, which 
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g > 1529
   
Figure 5.  Predicted price-per-pure-gram for crack cocaine in the Washington 





























































































1 < g ≤ 15
g > 15
 
Note: The prices for the three distribution levels are evaluated at 0.3, 5, and 38 grams, which 
are roughly the median quantities for each distribution level. 
 
Figure 6.  Predicted price-per-pure-gram for powder cocaine in the Washington 














































































































2 < g ≤ 10
10 < g ≤ 50
g > 50
 
Note: The prices for the four distribution levels are evaluated at 0.75, 5, 27, and 108 grams, 
which are roughly the median quantities for each distribution level. 
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Figure 7.  Predicted price-per-pure-gram for heroin in the Washington metropolitan area 













































































































1 < g ≤ 10
g > 10
Note: The prices for the three distribution levels are evaluated at 0.4, 2.5, and 27.5 grams, 
which are roughly the median quantities for each distribution level. 
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Table 1.  Crack cocaine observations by different quantity levels for DEA and MPDC data 
for the years evaluated by Horowitz. 
 DEA MPDC 
Year  g ≤ 1 1<g≤5  g>5  All  g ≤ 1 1<g≤5  g>5  All 
1990 6  16  60  82  620 4  19  643 
1991 6  24  107  137  846 11  33 890 
1992 13  15  58  86  383 21  55 459 
1993 9  3  48  60  194 10  46 250 
1994 8  31  84  123  45 9 40  94 
1995 22  14  48  84  62 10 18 90 
1996 10  22  60  92  35 10 15 60 
1997 5  4  58  67  55 26 49  130 
1998(Q1&Q2) 3  6  35  44  36 9 11  56 
Total for 
Horowitz’s years  82  135  558 
 




across levels  10.6% 17.4% 72.0% 
 
100%  85.2% 4.1% 10.7% 
 
100% 
Average Purity  72.7%  73.0%  67.2%  68.8%  78.6% 68.0% 64.8% 76.7% 




Table 2.  Heroin observations by different quantity levels for DEA, MPDC, and DEA data 
for the years evaluated by Horowitz. 
  DEA MPDC DMP 
   g ≤ 1 g > 1  All g ≤ 1 g > 1 All g ≤ 1  g > 1 All
1993  1 15 16 9 1 10 41  0 41
1994  0 3 3 9 2 11 41 0 41
1995  3 9 12 8 2 10 31  0 31
1996  2 4  61 42 43 83 9  03 9
1997  2 32 34 30 14 44 20 11 31
1998 (Q1 and 




10 90 100 85 43 128 188  16 204
Distribution 
across levels  10.0% 90.0% 100.0
%  66.4% 33.6% 100.0
%  92.2% 7.8%  100.0
% 
Average 
Purity  27.3% 59.2% 55.6% 26.3% 33.4% 28.8% 22.2% 18.4% 21.9% 
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  Table 3.  Effects of price and purity on the number of emergency room mentions of 
cocaine.   
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Lag for one quarter: 
 
Lags for two 
quarters: 
 
Lag for one quarter 
with same sample as 
that for lags with 
two quarters: 
































BIC  12,441 10,059 10,173 
  # observations  460  382  382 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 





Figure A1.  Predicted price trends for DEA and MPDC observations less than or equal to 5 



























2(16)==10.78 (p=0.82) ;   Correlation=0.65 
 
Figure A2.  Predicted price trends for DEA and MPDC observations greater than 5 grams, 



























2(16)=0.68 (p=1.00);  Correlation=0.81 34
   
Table A1.  Predicted prices per gram for crack cocaine for the Washington, DC 
metropolitan area for three distribution levels, 1986-2005, evaluated at 75% purity. 
  g ≤ 1  1 < g ≤ 15 g > 15
1990 190 140 87
1991 152 111 63
1992 151  94 62
1993 160  93 62
1994 150  88 53
1995 169  77 52
1996 130  78 50
1997 150  83 52
1998 130  78 45
1999 130  88 57
2000 154  95 58
2001 150  91 58
2002 134  70 53
2003 139  87 47
2004 104  71 44
2005 111  65 40
Table A2.  Predicted prices for one pure gram of crack cocaine for the Washington, DC 
metropolitan area for three distribution levels, 1986-2005, evaluated at 100% purity. 
  g ≤ 1  1 < g ≤ 15  g > 15
1986 435  213  112
1987 257  174  89
1988 188  108  83
1989 182  84  73
1990 237  170  109
1991 189  135  79
1992 188  114  77
1993 200  113  78
1994 188  107  67
1995 210  93  65
1996 163  95  62
1997 187  101  65
1998 162  95  56
1999 162  106  71
2000 193  115  73
2001 187  111  73
2002 168  85  66
2003 174  105  59
2004 130  87  56
2005 139  79  50
Note: The prices for the three distribution levels are evaluated at 0.3, 5, and 38 grams, which 
are roughly the median quantities for each distribution level.35
  Table A3.  Predicted prices for one pure gram of powder cocaine for the Washington, DC 
metropolitan area for three distribution levels, 1981-2005, evaluated at 100% purity. 
  g ≤ 2  2 < g ≤ 10  10 < g ≤ 50  g > 50 
1981 536 379 303 231
1982 653 398 292 201
1983 473 340 223 165
1984 395 288 199 143
1985 292 258 144 152
1986 266 206 156 121
1987 243 196 117 88
1988 194 159  97 68
1989 172 155  83 65
1990 197 213 109 76
1991 179 154  94 70
1992 178 165  98 56
1993  178 91 73 60
1994 150 139  75 52
1995 223 131  87 61
1996 205 113  58 51
1997  204 93 67 50
1998  155 91 58 48
1999  122 98 72 52
2000 161 137  68 61
2001 156 121  74 60
2002 144 101  64 53
2003 154 114  63 52
2004  122 94 56 48
2005  146 89 47 42
Note: The prices for the four distribution levels are evaluated at 0.75, 5, 27, and 108 grams, 
which are roughly the median quantities for each distribution level. 
 36
  Table A4.  Predicted prices for one pure gram of heroin for the Washington, DC 
metropolitan area for three distribution levels, 1981-2005, evaluated at 75% purity. 
  g ≤ 1  1 < g ≤ 10  g > 10 
1981 1672 1762 951
1982 1634 1346 856
1983 2478 1917 813
1984 1472 1728 766
1985 1146 1616 867
1986 1381 1114 577
1987 1106 1402 773
1988 781 858 507
1989 720 891 536
1990 1233 1109 717
1991 913  1157 529
1992 880 700 504
1993 770 682 402
1994 813 548 340
1995 727 571 282
1996 741 520 297
1997 730 466 286
1998 475 305 198
1999 424 333 218
2000 527 286 177
2001 380 275 118
2002 386 355 152
2003 414 373 183
2004 430 309 172
2005 471 298 167
Note: The prices for the three distribution levels are evaluated at 0.4, 2.5, and 27.5 grams, 
which are roughly the median quantities for each distribution level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 